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 INDICATIVE AND COUNTERFACTUAL CONDITIONALS 141
 opinion, albeit within an altered framework of assumptions. This
 implies that (5) and (z) are logically equivalent and differ only in what
 they indicate as to the speaker's assumptions concerning the truth value
 of their common antecedent.
 Lewis's chosen example, therefore, fails to establish his conclusion.
 But it is also doubtful whether any "knock-down" example could
 establish it. For as soon as one departs from such peculiarly simple
 conditionals as (i) and (z) have been revealed to be, it becomes
 very difficult to establish whether or not a given conditional is the
 counterfactual counterpart of another, indicative, conditional.3
 University of Reading C E. J. LowE 1979
 3 I should like to thank the Editor of Analysis and my brother, Malcolm F. Lowe, for
 their helpful comments on an earlier version of the present paper.
 MOORE'S PARADOX: ONE OR TWO?
 By J. N. WILLIAMS
 DISCUSSIONS of what is sometimes called 'Moore's paradox' are
 often vitiated by a failure to notice that there are two paradoxes;
 not merely one in two sets of linguistic clothing. The two paradoxes
 are absurd, but in different ways, and accordingly require different
 explanations.
 Moore himself seems guilty of this failure. In one place he wants to
 discuss why 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that
 I did' is 'a perfectly absurd thing to say', while in another he is puzzled
 by the fact that ".... it is absurd to say such a thing as 'I believe he has
 gone out, but he has not'...".
 The two things which Moore alleged it would be absurd for a
 speaker A to say can be expressed as
 (i) 'p and it is not the case A believes that p', (e.g. 'I went to the
 pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did').
 (ii) 'p and A believes that it is not the case that p', (e.g. 'I believe that
 he has gone out but he has not').
 Sentences of these two forms do not express the same proposition, nor
 does A commit the same absurdity in uttering both.
 The proposition expressed by (i) neither entails nor is entailed by that
 expressed by (ii). The distinction between them corresponds to the well
 known distinction between
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 142 ANALYSIS
 (iii) 'It is not the case that A believes that p', and
 (iv) 'A believes that it is not the case that p'.
 The proposition expressed by (iii) neither entails nor is entailed by that
 expressed by (iv).
 It is now uncontentious that the absurdity of A's saying either
 (i) or (ii) does not come from the self-contradictoriness of (i) or (ii).
 In both, what is expressed is possibly true, whereas what is self-
 contradictory is not. In both cases the absurdity lies not in what A
 says, but in the conjunction of what A says with his saying of what
 he says.
 In saying 'p' one normally suggests that one believes that p, or
 expresses a belief that p. It is this suggestion or expression of belief that
 p in conjunction with the assertion, in the case of (i), that one does not
 believe that p or, in the case of (ii), that one believes that it is not the
 case that p, which gives rise to the absurdity.
 But here the absurdity of (i) differs from that of (ii). For normally,
 it is absurd for A to assert (i) because what is conjointly expressed and
 asserted, i.e. a belief thatp and a lack of belief thatp, is logically impossible.
 The absurdity in (ii) is of a different kind. For normally, it is absurd
 for A to assert (ii), not because what is conjointly expressed and as-
 serted, i.e. a belief that p and a belief that it is not the case that p, is
 logically impossible, but because it is inconsistent.
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